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Modern Industrial Organization

by: Carlton, Dennis W.; Perloff, Jeffrey M.

Modern Industrial Organization

by: Carlton, Dennis W.; Perloff, Jeffrey M.

ISBN 13:
9780321180230
ISBN 10:
0321180232
Edition: 4th
Format: Paperback
Copyright: 05/13/2004
Publisher: Pearson

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Summary

Written by two of the field's most respected researchers, Modern Industrial Organization goes beyond the traditional structure-conduct-performance framework by using the latest advances in microeconomic theory, including transaction cost analysis, game theory, contestability, and information economics. Fully updated to reflect new trends and topics, the Fourth Edition focuses on providing students with a clear, unified structure for analyzing theories and empirical evidence about the organization of firms and industries.

PART 1 Introduction and Theory

(54)

CHAPTER 1 Overview

(9)

Models

(4)

Price Theory

(2)

Transaction Costs

(1)

Game Theory

(1)

Contestable Markets

(1)

Organization

(5)

Basic Theory

(1)

Market Structures

(2)

Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct

(1)

Information, Advertising, and Disclosure

(1)

Dynamic Models and Market Clearing

(1)

Government Policies and Their Effects

(1)

CHAPTER 2 The Firm and Costs

(44)

The Firm

(8)

The Objective of a Firm

(1)

Ownership and Control

(7)

Mergers and Acquisitions

(9)

Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions

(3)

Merger Activity in the United States

(2)

Merger Activities in Other Countries

(1)

Empirical Evidence on the Efficiency and Profitability of Mergers

(3)

Cost Concepts

(7)

Types of Costs

(4)

Cost Concepts

(3)

Economies of Scale

(4)

Reasons for Economies of Scale

(2)

Total Costs Determine Scale Economies

(1)

A Measure of Scale Economies

(1)

Empirical Studies of Cost Curves

(3)

Economies of Scale in Total Manufacturing Costs

(2)

Survivorship Studies

(1)

Cost Concepts for Multiproduct Firms

(4)

Adaptation of Traditional Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm

(1)

Economies of Scope

(1)

Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope

(1)

Specialization in Manufacturing

(1)

An Example of an Industry with Economies of Scope

(1)

Summary

(3)

Problems

(1)

Suggested Readings

(1)

APPENDIX 2A Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm

EXAMPLE 2.1 Value of Limited Liability

(3)

EXAMPLE 2.2 Conflicts of Interest Between Managers and Shareholders

(19)

EXAMPLE 2.3 Specialization of Labor

(4)

EXAMPLE 2.4 Indiana Libraries

(5)

EXAMPLE 2.5 The Baking Industry

(1)

EXAMPLE 2.6 Electricity Minimum Efficient Scale and Scope

(8)

PART 2 Market Structures

(234)

CHAPTER 3 Competition

(32)

Perfect Competition

(8)

Assumptions

(1)

The Behavior of a Single Firm

(3)

The Competitive Market

(4)

Elasticities and the Residual Demand Curve

(4)

Elasticities of Demand and Supply

(1)

The Residual Demand Curve of Price Takers

(3)

Efficiency and Welfare

(4)

Efficiency

(1)

Welfare

(3)

Entry and Exit

(9)

Restrictions on Entry

(3)

Competition with Few Firms-Contestability

(1)

Definition of Barriers to Entry

(3)

Identifying Barriers to Entry

(1)

The Size of Entry Barriers by Industry

(2)

Externalities

(2)

Limitations of Perfect Competition

(1)

The Many Meanings of Competition

(1)

Summary

Problems

EXAMPLE 3.3 Are Farmers Price Takers?

(5)

EXAMPLE 3.2 Restrictions on Entry Across Countries

(1)

EXAMPLE 3.3 FTC Opposes Internet Bans That Harm Competition

(8)

EXAMPLE 3.3 Increasing Congestion

(5)

CHAPTER 4 Monopolies, Monopsonies, and Dominant Firms

(34)

Monopoly Behavior

(6)

Profit Maximization

(4)

Market and Monopoly Power

(1)

The Incentive for Efficient Operation

(1)

Monopoly Behavior over Time

(1)

The Costs and Benefits of Monopoly

(4)

The Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

(1)

Rent-Seeking Behavior

(1)

Monopoly Profits and Deadweight Loss Vary with the Elasticity of Demand

(2)

The Benefits of Monopoly

(1)

Creating and Maintaining a Monopoly

(6)

Knowledge Advantage

100

(2)

Government-Created Monopolies

102

(2)

Natural Monopoly

104

(1)

Profits and Monopoly

105

(2)

Is Any Firm That Earns a Positive Profit a Monopoly?

105

(1)

Does a Monopoly Always Earn a Positive Profit?

106

(1)

Are Monopoly Mergers to Eliminate Short-Run Losses Desirable?

106

(1)

Monopsony

107

(3)

Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe

110

(9)

Why Some Firms Are Dominant

111

(1)

The No-Entry Model

112

(3)

The Dominant Firm-Competitive Fringe Equilibrium

115

(1)

A Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry

116

(3)

Summary

119

Problems

120

(1)

Suggested Readings

121

EXAMPLE 4.1 Monopoly Newspaper Ad Prices

(7)

EXAMPLE 4.2 Monopolizing by Merging

100

(1)

EXAMPLE 4.3 Controlling a Key Ingredient

101

(1)

EXAMPLE 4.4 Preventing Imitation-Cat Got Your Tongue?

101

(2)

EXAMPLE 4.5 Protecting a Monopoly

103

(3)

EXAMPLE 4.6 EU Allows Merger to Eliminate Losses

106

(3)

EXAMPLE 4.7 Priest Monopsony

109

(2)

EXAMPLE 4.8 Price Umbrella

111

(6)

EXAMPLE 4.9 China Tobacco Monopoly to Become a Dominant Firm

117

(5)

CHAPTER 5 Cartels

122

(35)

Why Cartels Form

123

(2)

Creating and Enforcing the Cartel

125

(22)

Factors That Facilitate the Formation of Cartels

127

(9)

Enforcing a Cartel Agreement

136

(8)

Cartels and Price Wars

144

(3)

Consumers Gain as Cartels Fail

147

(3)

Price-Fixing Laws

150

(2)

Summary

152

(3)

Problems

154

(1)

Suggested Readings

154

(1)

APPENDIX 5A The Effects of Cartel Size

155

EXAMPLE 5.1 An Electrifying Conspiracy

128

(4)

EXAMPLE 5.2 The Viability of Commodity Cartels

132

(6)

EXAMPLE 5.3 Concrete Example of Government Aided Collusion

138

(2)

EXAMPLE 5.4 Relieving the Headache of Running a Cartel

140

(2)

EXAMPLE 5.5 Vitamins Cartel

142

(3)

EXAMPLE 5.6 How Consumers Were Railroaded

145

(5)

EXAMPLE 5.7 The Social Costs of Cartelization

150

(2)

EXAMPLE 5.8 Prosecuting Global Cartels

152

(5)

CHAPTER 6 Oligopoly

157

(43)

Game Theory

159

(1)

Single-Period Oligopoly Models

160

(20)

Nash Equilibrium

161

(1)

The Cournot Model

161

(10)

The Bertrand Model

171

(5)

The Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model

176

(4)

A Comparison of the Major Oligopoly Models

180

(1)

Multiperiod Games

180

(9)

Single-Period Prisoners' Dilemma Game

181

(2)

Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game

183

(3)

Types of Equilibria in Multiperiod Games

186

(3)

Experimental Evidence on Oligopoly Models

189

(2)

Summary

191

(3)

Problems

192

(1)

Suggested Readings

193

(1)

APPENDIX 6A A Mathematical Derivation of Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria

194

(4)

APPENDIX 6B Mixed Strategies

198

EXAMPLE 6.1 Do Birds of a Feather Cournot-Flock Together?

166

(3)

EXAMPLE 6.2 Oligopoly Welfare Losses

169

(2)

EXAMPLE 6.3 Mergers in a Cournot Economy

171

(6)

EXAMPLE 6.4 Roller Coaster Gasoline Pricing

177

(7)

EXAMPLE 6.5 Copying Pricing

184

(1)

EXAMPLE 6.6 Car Wars

185

(15)

CHAPTER 7 Product Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition

200

(44)

Differentiated Products

202

(4)

The Effect of Differentiation on a Firm's Demand Curve

203

(2)

Preferences for Characteristics of Products

205

(1)

The Representative Consumer Model

206

(14)

A Representative Consumer Model with Undifferentiated Products

206

(8)

A Representative Consumer Model with Differentiated Products

214

(5)

Conclusions About Representative Consumer Models

219

(1)

Location Models

220

(10)

Hotelling's Location Model

221

(2)

Salop's Circle Model

223

(7)

Hybrid Models

230

(1)

Estimation of Differentiated Goods Models

231

(2)

Summary

233

(2)

Problems

234

(1)

Suggested Readings

234

(1)

APPENDIX 7A Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Homogeneous Products

235

(5)

APPENDIX 7B Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Differentiated Products

240

EXAMPLE 7.1 All Water Is Not the Same

204

(7)

EXAMPLE 7.2 Entry Lowers Prices

211

(5)

EXAMPLE 7.3 The Jeans Market

216

(13)

EXAMPLE 7.4 A Serial Problem

229

(3)

EXAMPLE 7.5 Combining Beers

232

(1)

EXAMPLE 7.6 Value of Minivans

233

(11)

CHAPTER 8 Industry Structure and Performance

244

(45)

Theories of Price Markups and Profits

245

(1)

Structure-Conduct-Performance

246

(22)

Measures of Market Performance

246

(1)

Rates of Return

247

(7)

Price-Cost Margins

254

(1)

Measures of Market Structure

255

(4)

The Relationship of Structure to Performance

259

(9)

Modern Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis

268

(13)

Theory

268

(4)

Empirical Research

272

(2)

Modern Approaches to Measuring Performance

274

(1)

Static Studies

275

(6)

Summary

281

(2)

Problems

282

(1)

APPENDIX 8A Relationship Between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Price-Cost Margin

283

(1)

APPENDIX 8B Identifying Market Power

284

EXAMPLE 8.1 Supermarkets and Concentration

273

(5)

EXAMPLE 8.2 How Sweet It Is

278

(11)

PART 3 Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct

289

(150)

CHAPTER 9 Price Discrimination

290

(23)

Nonuniform Pricing

291

(2)

Incentive and Conditions for Price Discrimination

293

(3)

Profit Motive for Price Discrimination

293

(1)

Conditions for Price Discrimination

294

(1)

Resales

294

(2)

Types of Price Discrimination

296

(10)

Perfect Price Discrimination

299

(1)

Each Consumer Buys More Than One Unit

300

(1)

Different Prices to Different Groups

301

(4)

Other Methods of Third-Degree Price Discrimination

305

(1)

Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination

306

(2)

Summary

308

(2)

Problems

309

(1)

Suggested Readings

309

(1)

APPENDIX 9A An Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders

310

EXAMPLE 9.1 Coupons

292

(3)

EXAMPLE 9.2 Thank You, Doctor

295

(2)

EXAMPLE 9.3 Halting Drug Resale from Canada

297

(1)

EXAMPLE 9.4 Vertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal

298

(4)

EXAMPLE 9.5 A Discriminating Labor Union

302

(6)

EXAMPLE 9.6 Does Competition Always Lower Price?

308

(5)

CHAPTER 10 Advanced Topics in Pricing

313

(37)

Nonlinear Pricing

313

(6)

A Single Two-Part Tariff

314

(2)

Two Two-Part Tariffs

316

(3)

Tie-in Sales

319

(17)

General Justifications for Tie-in Sales

319

(2)

Tie-in Sales as a Method of Price Discrimination

321

(1)

Package Tie-in Sales of Independent Products

322

(8)

Interrelated Demands

330

(6)

Quality Choice

336

(1)

Other Methods of Nonlinear Pricing

336

(2)

Minimum Quantities and Quantity Discounts

336

(1)

Selection of Price Schedules

337

(1)

Premium for Priority

337

(1)

Auctions

338

(1)

Summary

338

(3)

Problems

340

(1)

APPENDIX 10A The Optimal Two-Part Tariff

341

(3)

APPENDIX 10B Nonlinear Pricing with an Example

344

EXAMPLE 10.1 Football Tariffs

314

(6)

EXAMPLE 10.2 You Auto Save from Tie-in Sales

320

(1)

EXAMPLE 10.3 Stuck Holding the Bag

320

(5)

EXAMPLE 10.4 Tied to TV

325

(4)

EXAMPLE 10.5 Not Too Suite-Mixed Bundling

329

(10)

EXAMPLE 10.6 Price Discriminating on eBay

339

(11)

CHAPTER 11 Strategic Behavior

350

(45)

Strategic Behavior Defined

350

(1)

Noncooperative Strategic Behavior

351

(28)

Predatory Pricing

352

(8)

Limit Pricing

360

(7)

Investments to Lower Production Costs

367

(4)

Raising Rivals' Costs

371

(7)

Welfare Implications and the Role of the Courts

378

(1)

Cooperative Strategic Behavior

379

(7)

Practices That Facilitate Collusion

379

(7)

Cooperative Strategic Behavior and the Role of the Courts

386

(1)

Summary

386

(3)

Problems

387

(1)

Suggested Readings

388

(1)

APPENDIX 11A: The Strategic Use of Tie-in Sales and Product Compatibility to Create or Maintain Market Power with Applications to Networks

389

EXAMPLE 11.1 Supreme Court Says Alleged Predation Must Be Credible

354

(4)

EXAMPLE 11.2 Evidence of Predatory Pricing in Tobacco

358

(7)

EXAMPLE 11.3 The Shrinking Share of Dominant Firms

365

(1)

EXAMPLE 11.4 And Only a Smile Remained

366

(8)

EXAMPLE 11.5 Strategic Behavior and Rapid Technological Change: The Microsoft Case

374

(3)

EXAMPLE 11.6 Value of Preventing Entry

377

(5)

EXAMPLE 11.7 The FTC versus Ethyl et al.

382

(1)

EXAMPLE 11.8 Information Exchanges: The Hardwood Case

383

(12)

CHAPTER 12 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restrictions

395

(44)

The Reasons for and Against Vertical Integration

396

(16)

Integration to Lower Transaction Costs

400

(3)

Integration to Assure Supply

403

(1)

Integration to Eliminate Externalities

404

(1)

Integration to Avoid Government Intervention

404

(1)

Integration to Increase Monopoly Profits

405

(7)

Integration to Eliminate Market Power

412

(1)

The Life Cycle of a Firm

412

(2)

Vertical Restrictions

414

(17)

Vertical Restrictions Used to Solve Problems in Distribution

415

(10)

The Effects of Vertical Restrictions

425

(5)

Banning Vertical Restrictions

430

(1)

Franchising

431

(2)

Empirical Evidence

433

(4)

Evidence on Vertical Integration

433

(2)

Evidence on Vertical Restrictions

435

(2)

Summary

437

Problems

438

(1)

Suggested Readings

438

EXAMPLE 12.1 Outsourcing

397

(1)

EXAMPLE 12.2 Preventing Holdups

398

(6)

EXAMPLE 12.3 Own Your Own Steel Mill

404

(15)

EXAMPLE 12.4 Double Markup

419

(1)

EXAMPLE 12.5 Blockbuster's Solution to the Double Marginalization Problem

420

(2)

EXAMPLE 12.6 Free Riding on the Web

422

(4)

EXAMPLE 12.7 Brewing Trouble: Restricting Vertical Integration in Alcoholic Beverage Industries

426

(13)

PART 4 Information, Advertising, and Disclosure

439

(58)

CHAPTER 13 Information

440

(31)

Why Information Is Limited

441

(2)

Limited Information About Quality

443

(9)

The Market for "Lemons"

443

(3)

Solving the Problem: Equal Information

446

(4)

Evidence on Lemons Markets

450

(2)

Limited Information About Price

452

(10)

The Tourist-Trap Model

453

(9)

The Tourists-and-Natives Model

457

(5)

Providing Consumer Information Lowers Price

462

(5)

How Information Lowers Prices

463

(2)

An Example: Grocery Store Information Programs

465

(2)

Summary

467

(2)

Problems

468

(1)

Suggested Readings

468

(1)

APPENDIX 13A Market Shares in the Tourists-and-Natives Model

469

EXAMPLE 13.1 Genetically Modified Organisms: Do Consumers Not Care or Not Read?

442

(2)

EXAMPLE 13.2 Understanding Consumer Information

444

(3)

EXAMPLE 13.3 Counterfeit Halal Meat

447

(4)

EXAMPLE 13.4 Certifying Thoroughbreds

451

(2)

EXAMPLE 13.5 Price Dispersion and Search Costs in the Talmud

453

(5)

EXAMPLE 13.6 Price Dispersion

458

(6)

EXAMPLE 13.7 Tourist Cameras

464

(7)

CHAPTER 14 Advertising and Disclosure

471

(26)

Information and Advertising

474

(6)

Promotions

474

(1)

"Search" Versus "Experience" Goods

475

(1)

Informational Versus Persuasive Advertising

476

(1)

Profit-Maximizing Advertising

477

(3)

Effects of Advertising on Welfare

480

(9)

Price Advertising Increases Welfare

481

(1)

Advertising to Solve the Lemons Problem

481

(2)

When Advertising Is Excessive

483

(6)

False Advertising

489

(5)

Limits to Lying

489

(2)

Antifraud Laws

491

(1)

Disclosure Laws

492

(2)

Summary

494

(2)

Problems

494

(1)

Suggested Readings

495

(1)

APPENDIX 14A Profit-Maximizing Advertising

496

EXAMPLE 14.1 Branding and Labeling

475

(3)

EXAMPLE 14.2 Celebrity Endorsements

478

(2)

EXAMPLE 14.3 Milk Advertising

480

(2)

EXAMPLE 14.4 Social Gain from Price Advertising

482

(5)

EXAMPLE 14.5 Welfare Effects of Restricting Alcohol Ads

487

(6)

EXAMPLE 14.6 Let All Who Are Hungry Come and Eat

493

(4)

PART 5 Dynamic Models and Market Clearing

497

(98)

CHAPTER 15 Decision making over Time: Durability

498

(27)

How Long Should a Durable Good Last?

498

(7)

Competitive Firm's Choice of Durability

499

(1)

The Monopoly's Choice of Durability

500

(3)

Costly Installation and Maintenance

503

(2)

Renting Versus Selling by a Monopoly

505

(15)

Resale Market

505

(2)

Consumers' Expectations Constrain the Monopoly

507

(13)

Summary

520

(2)

Problems

521

(1)

Suggested Readings

521

(1)

APPENDIX 15A Multiperiod Durable Goods Monopoly

522

EXAMPLE 15.1 United Shoe

504

(4)

EXAMPLE 15.2 The Importance of Used Goods

508

(2)

EXAMPLE 15.3 The Alcoa Case: Secondhand Economics

510

(2)

EXAMPLE 15.4 Leasing Under Adverse Selection

512

(7)

EXAMPLE 15.5 Sales Versus Rentals

519

(1)

EXAMPLE 15.6 Lowering the Resale Price of Used Textbooks

520

(5)

CHAPTER 16 Patents and Technological Change

525

(44)

Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks

526

(4)

Patents

526

(2)

Copyrights

528

(1)

Trademarks

529

(1)

Distinctions Between Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks

530

(1)

Incentives for Inventions Are Needed

530

(9)

Imitation Discourages Research

532

(1)

Patents Encourage Research

532

(4)

Patents Encourage Disclosure

536

(3)

Patents, Prizes, Research Contracts, and Joint Ventures

539

(21)

Determining the Optimal Number of Firms

541

(1)

No Government Incentives

542

(1)

Government-Financed Research

543

(1)

Prizes

544

(3)

Relaxing Antitrust Laws: Joint Ventures

547

(1)

Patents

548

(6)

Government Uncertainty

554

(1)

Patent Holders May Manufacture or License

554

(4)

Eliminating Patents

558

(2)

Market Structure

560

(6)

Market Structure Without a Patent Race

560

(1)

Optimal Timing of Innovations

561

(3)

Monopolies in Patent Races

564

(2)

Summary

566

Problems

567

(1)

Suggested Readings

568

EXAMPLE 16.1 Piracy

534

(3)

EXAMPLE 16.2 Patents Versus Secrets

537

(1)

EXAMPLE 16.3 Monkey See, Monkey Do

538

(6)

EXAMPLE 16.4 Joint Public-Private R&D

544

(1)

EXAMPLE 16.5 Prizes

545

(7)

EXAMPLE 16.6 Mickey Mouse Legislation

552

(3)

EXAMPLE 16.7 European Patents

555

(10)

EXAMPLE 16.8 Patent Thicket

565

(4)

CHAPTER 17 How Markets Clear: Theory and Facts

569

(26)

How Markets Clear: Three Simple Theories

570

(1)

Competition

570

(1)

Oligopoly Models

570

(1)

Monopoly

570

(1)

Empirical Evidence on the Role of Price in Allocating Goods

571

(8)

The Rigidity of Prices

572

(6)

Movements in Prices and Price-Cost Margins over the Business Cycle

578

(1)

Explaining the Evidence

579

(12)

Extensions to the Simple Theory: The Introduction of Time

580

(3)

Fixed Costs of Changing Price

583

(1)

Implications of an Unchanging Price for Inventories

584

(2)

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

586

(1)

Toward a General Theory of Allocation

587

(4)

Market Structure Is More Than Concentration

591

(2)

Produce-to-Order Versus Produce-to-Stock

591

(1)

Transmission of Shocks in Industries with Fixed Prices

592

(1)

Summary

593

Problems

593

EXAMPLE 17.1 Price Rigidity: It's the Real Thing

577

(2)

EXAMPLE 17.2 How Much Is That Turkey in the Window?

579

(6)

EXAMPLE 17.3 The Cost of Changing Prices

585

(3)

EXAMPLE 17.4 Creating Futures Markets

588

(2)

EXAMPLE 17.3 Oh Say Does That Star-Spangled Banner Yet Fly?

590

(5)

PART 6 Government Policies and Their Effects

595

(142)

CHAPTER 18 International Trade

596

(35)

Reasons for Trade Between Countries

596

(12)

Comparative Advantage

597

(1)

Intra-Industry Trade in Differentiated Products

598

(1)

Free Riding, International Price Differences, and Gray Markets

598

(5)

Dumping

603

(5)

Tariffs, Subsidies, and Quotas

608

(19)

Competition

609

(2)

Creating and Battling Monopolies

611

(7)

Strategic Trade Policy

618

(4)

Industries with Positive Externalities

622

(1)

Empirical Evidence on Intervention in International Trade

623

(4)

Summary

627

(2)

Problems

627

(2)

APPENDIX 18A Derivation of the Optimal Subsidy

629

EXAMPLE 18.1 Gray Markets

600

(12)

EXAMPLE 18.2 Timber Wars and Retaliation

612

(4)

EXAMPLE 18.3 Foreign Doctors

616

(2)

EXAMPLE 18.4 Being Taken for a Ride: Japanese Cars

618

(7)

EXAMPLE 18.5 Wide-Body Aircraft

625

(1)

EXAMPLE 18.6 Steeling from U.S. Customers

626

(5)

CHAPTER 19 Antitrust Laws and Policy

631

(51)

The Antitrust Laws and Their Purposes

632

(10)

Antitrust Statutes

632

(1)

Enforcement

633

(1)

Goals of the Antitrust Laws

634

(3)

Who May Sue?

637

(2)

Economic Theory of Damages

639

(1)

The Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws

640

(2)

Private Litigation

642

(1)

Market Power and the Definition of Markets

642

(6)

Market Power

642

(2)

Market Definition

644

(4)

Cooperation Among Competitors

648

(13)

Price-Fixing and Output Agreements

649

(2)

Not All Agreements Among Competitors Are Illegal

651

(2)

Information Exchanges Among Competitors

653

(2)

Oligopoly Behavior

655

(2)

Mergers

657

(4)

Exclusionary Actions and Other Strategic Behavior

661

(13)

Competition Between Rivals

662

(1)

Competitive Behavior Deemed Undesirable by the Court

662

(6)

Vertical Arrangements Between Firms

668

(6)

Price Discrimination

674

(3)

Price Discrimination Under Robinson-Patman

674

(1)

Tie-in Sales

675

(2)

Effects of Antitrust Laws on the Organization of Unregulated and Regulated Firms

677

(2)

Summary

679

Problems

680

(1)

Suggested Readings

681

EXAMPLE 19.1 Using the Government to Create Market Power: Misuse of the Orange Book

635

(3)

EXAMPLE 19.2 Conflict Between European and U.S. Antitrust Authorities: GE-Honeywell

638

(7)

EXAMPLE 19.3 The Merger Guidelines

645

(5)

EXAMPLE 19.4 Antitrust Laws in Other Countries

650

(4)

EXAMPLE 19.5 Colleges and Antitrust: Does Your School Belong to a Cartel?

654

(19)

EXAMPLE 19.6 The FTC Plays with Toys 'R' Us

673

(9)

CHAPTER 20 Regulation and Deregulation

682

(55)

The Objectives of Regulators

686

(5)

Market Inefficiencies

686

(1)

Correcting Market Inefficiencies

687

(1)

Capture Theory and Interest-Group Theory

687

(4)

Making Monopolies More Competitive

691

(16)

Government Ownership

692

(1)

Privatizing

692

(2)

Franchise Bidding

694

(2)

Price Controls

696

(11)

Rate-of-Return Regulation

707

(7)

Quality Effects

712

(2)

Making Competitive Industries More Monopolistic

714

(7)

Limiting Entry

716

(2)

Agricultural Regulations: Price Supports and Quantity Controls

718

(3)

Deregulation

721

(13)

Airlines

724

(6)

Ground Transportation

730

(4)

Summary

734

Problems

734

(1)

Suggested Readings

735

EXAMPLE 20.1 Pizza Protection

685

(3)

EXAMPLE 20.2 Cross-Subsidization

688

(1)

EXAMPLE 20.3 Legal Monopolies

689

(4)

EXAMPLE 20.4 Public, Monopolistic, and Competitive Refuse Collection

693

(22)

EXAMPLE 20.5 Rent Control

715

(2)

EXAMPLE 20.6 Brewing Trouble

717

(9)

EXAMPLE 20.7 Deregulating Electricity: California in Shock

726

(2)

EXAMPLE 20.8 International and U.S. Deregulation in Telecommunications

728

(3)

EXAMPLE 20.9 European Deregulation of Airlines

731

(6)

Bibliography

737

(43)

Glossary

780

(7)

Answers to Odd-Numbered Problems

787

(8)

Legal Case Index

795

(3)

Author Index

798

(10)

Subject Index

808

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Modern Industrial Organization

Modern Industrial Organization

9780321180230

0321180232

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