This book examines Pakistan's strategies in the war against Islamist armed groups beginning in late 2001, following the 9/11 attacks. The focus of the book is firstly the formulation of Pakistan'¬"s strategies, and secondly, the outcomes of these strategies over the course of a conflict that has lasted a decade. The significance of Pakistan'¬"s decade long conflict can hardly be understated. Starting in the tribal territories adjacent to Afghanistan, Pakistan'¬"s war has come to engulf the majority of the country most strikingly through a brutal campaign of suicide bombings. Thousands of Pakistani lives have been lost, the Pakistani military has been engaged in its most sustained campaign in history, and the geostrategic balance of the region has been thrown into deep uncertainty. This book is an account of a decade-long war that is yet to be chronicled in systematic fashion as a campaign of military manoeuvre and terrorist reprisal. It is also an analytic account of the ingredients of Pakistan'¬"s strategic calculus during this time, both in military and political terms, and how these ingredients have been filtered by Pakistan'¬"s unique strategic culture. Strategy is about choice, and this book is informed by the theoretical strategic studies literature in how its forges a link between the determinants and outcomes of Pakistan'¬"s strategies. 㬬