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Vehicle Safety Communications Protocols, Security, and Privacy

by: Zhang, Tao; Delgrossi, Luca

Vehicle Safety Communications Protocols, Security, and Privacy

by: Zhang, Tao; Delgrossi, Luca

ISBN 13:
9781118132722
ISBN 10:
1118132726
Edition: 1st
Format: Hardcover
Copyright: 10/16/2012
Publisher: Wiley

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Vehicle Safety Communications Protocols, Security, and Privacy > ISBN13: 9781118132722

Summary

Owing to their safety applications, cooperative vehicle systems, which use sensors and wireless technologies to reduce traffic accidents, continue to be the focus of heavy research and development efforts around the world. Written by industry professionals, this book provides a systematic description of cooperative vehicle systems, discussing key technical issues in such systems, the latest advances in enabling technologies, and cutting-edge research trends. Coverage includes important technologies such as 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC), on-board equipment (OBE), and roadside equipment (RSE).

Author Biography

LUCA DELGROSSI, PhD, is Director of Driver Assistance and Chassis Systems U.S. at Mercedes-Benz Research & Development North America, Inc., Chairman of the Board of Directors at the VII Consortium, and coeditor of the IEEE Communications Magazine Automotive Networking Series.

TAO ZHANG, PhD, is Chief Scientist for Smart Connected Vehicles at Cisco Systems. He is a Fellow of the IEEE and the coauthor of IP-Based Next-Generation Wireless Networks.

Foreword xv
Ralf G. Herrtwich

Foreword xvii
Flavio Bonomi

Foreword xix
Adam Drobot

Preface xxi

Acknowledgments xxv

1 Traffic Safety 1

1.1 Traffic Safety Facts / 1

1.1.1 Fatalities / 2

1.1.2 Leading Causes of Crashes / 3

1.1.3 Current Trends / 5

1.2 European Union / 5

1.3 Japan / 7

1.4 Developing Countries / 7

References / 8

2 Automotive Safety Evolution 10

2.1 Passive Safety / 10

2.1.1 Safety Cage and the Birth of Passive Safety / 10

2.1.2 Seat Belts / 11

2.1.3 Air Bags / 11

2.2 Active Safety / 12

2.2.1 Antilock Braking System / 12

2.2.2 Electronic Stability Control / 13

2.2.3 Brake Assist / 13

2.3 Advanced Driver Assistance Systems / 14

2.3.1 Adaptive Cruise Control / 15

2.3.2 Blind Spot Assist / 16

2.3.3 Attention Assist / 16

2.3.4 Precrash Systems / 16

2.4 Cooperative Safety / 17

References / 18

3 Vehicle Architectures 20

3.1 Electronic Control Units / 20

3.2 Vehicle Sensors / 21

3.2.1 Radars / 21

3.2.2 Cameras / 21

3.3 Onboard Communication Networks / 22

3.3.1 Controller Area Network / 23

3.3.2 Local Interconnect Network / 23

3.3.3 FlexRay / 24

3.3.4 Media Oriented Systems Transport / 24

3.3.5 Onboard Diagnostics / 24

3.4 Vehicle Data / 25

3.5 Vehicle Data Security / 26

3.6 Vehicle Positioning / 27

3.6.1 Global Positioning System / 27

3.6.2 Galileo / 29

3.6.3 Global Navigation Satellite System / 29

3.6.4 Positioning Accuracy / 30

References / 30

4 Connected Vehicles 32

4.1 Connected Vehicle Applications / 32

4.1.1 Hard Safety Applications / 32

4.1.2 Soft Safety Applications / 33

4.1.3 Mobility and Convenience Applications / 33

4.2 Uniqueness in Consumer Vehicle Networks / 34

4.3 Vehicle Communication Modes / 36

4.3.1 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Local Broadcast / 36

4.3.2 V2V Multihop Message Dissemination / 37

4.3.3 Infrastructure-to-Vehicle Local Broadcast / 38

4.3.4 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Bidirectional Communications / 39

4.4 Wireless Communications Technology for Vehicles / 39

References / 42

5 Dedicated Short-Range Communications 44

5.1 The 5.9 GHz Spectrum / 44

5.1.1 DSRC Frequency Band Usage / 45

5.1.2 DSRC Channels / 45

5.1.3 DSRC Operations / 46

5.2 DSRC in the European Union / 46

5.3 DSRC in Japan / 47

5.4 DSRC Standards / 48

5.4.1 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments / 48

5.4.2 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments Protocol Stack / 48

5.4.3 International Harmonization / 50

References / 50

6 WAVE Physical Layer 52

6.1 Physical Layer Operations / 52

6.1.1 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing / 52

6.1.2 Modulation and Coding Rates / 53

6.1.3 Frame Reception / 54

6.2 PHY Amendments / 55

6.2.1 Channel Width / 56

6.2.2 Spectrum Masks / 56

6.2.3 Improved Receiver Performance / 57

6.3 PHY Layer Modeling / 57

6.3.1 Network Simulator Architecture / 58

6.3.2 RF Model / 59

6.3.3 Wireless PHY / 61

References / 62

7 WAVE Media Access Control Layer 64

7.1 Media Access Control Layer Operations / 64

7.1.1 Carrier Sensing Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance / 64

7.1.2 Hidden Terminal Effects / 65

7.1.3 Basic Service Set / 66

7.2 MAC Layer Amendments / 66

7.3 MAC Layer Modeling / 67

7.3.1 Transmission / 68

7.3.2 Reception / 68

7.3.3 Channel State Manager / 68

7.3.4 Back-Off Manager / 69

7.3.5 Transmission Coordination / 70

7.3.6 Reception Coordination / 71

7.4 Overhauled ns-2 Implementation / 72

References / 74

8 DSRC Data Rates 75

8.1 Introduction / 75

8.2 Communication Density / 76

8.2.1 Simulation Study / 77

8.2.2 Broadcast Reception Rates / 78

8.2.3 Channel Access Delay / 81

8.2.4 Frames Reception Failures / 83

8.3 Optimal Data Rate / 85

8.3.1 Modulation and Coding Rates / 85

8.3.2 Simulation Study / 86

8.3.3 Simulation Matrix / 87

8.3.4 Simulation Results / 88

References / 91

9 WAVE Upper Layers 93

9.1 Introduction / 93

9.2 DSRC Multichannel Operations / 94

9.2.1 Time Synchronization / 94

9.2.2 Synchronization Intervals / 95

9.2.3 Guard Intervals / 96

9.2.4 Channel Switching / 96

9.2.5 Channel Switching State Machine / 96

9.3 Protocol Evaluation / 97

9.3.1 Simulation Study / 98

9.3.2 Simulation Scenarios / 99

9.3.3 Simulation Results / 99

9.3.4 Protocol Enhancements / 102

9.4 WAVE Short Message Protocol / 103

References / 104

10 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Safety Applications 106

10.1 Intersection Crashes / 106

10.2 Cooperative Intersection Collision Avoidance System for Violations / 107

10.2.1 CICAS-V Design / 107

10.2.2 CICAS-V Development / 110

10.2.3 CICAS-V Testing / 116

10.3 Integrated Safety Demonstration / 118

10.3.1 Demonstration Concept / 118

10.3.2 Hardware Components / 120

10.3.3 Demo Design / 121

References / 124

11 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Safety Applications 126

11.1 Cooperation among Vehicles / 126

11.2 V2V Safety Applications / 127

11.3 V2V Safety Applications Design / 128

11.3.1 Basic Safety Messages / 129

11.3.2 Minimum Performance Requirements / 129

11.3.3 Target Classifi cation / 131

11.3.4 Vehicle Representation / 132

11.3.5 Sample Applications / 133

11.4 System Implementation / 135

11.4.1 Onboard Unit Hardware Components / 135

11.4.2 OBU Software Architecture / 135

11.4.3 Driver–Vehicle Interface / 137

11.5 System Testing / 138

11.5.1 Communications Coverage and Antenna Considerations / 138

11.5.2 Positioning / 139

References / 140

12 DSRC Scalability 141

12.1 Introduction / 141

12.2 DSRC Data Traffi c / 142

12.2.1 DSRC Safety Messages / 142

12.2.2 Transmission Parameters / 143

12.2.3 Channel Load Assessment / 144

12.3 Congestion Control Algorithms / 145

12.3.1 Desired Properties / 145

12.3.2 Transmission Power Adjustment / 146

12.3.3 Message Rate Adjustment / 147

12.3.4 Simulation Study / 148

12.4 Conclusions / 148

References / 149

13 Security and Privacy Threats and Requirements 151

13.1 Introduction / 151

13.2 Adversaries / 151

13.3 Security Threats / 152

13.3.1 Send False Safety Messages Using Valid Security Credentials / 152

13.3.2 Falsely Accuse Innocent Vehicles / 153

13.3.3 Impersonate Vehicles or Other Network Entities / 153

13.3.4 Denial-of-Service Attacks Specific to Consumer Vehicle Networks / 154

13.3.5 Compromise OBU Software or Firmware / 155

13.4 Privacy Threats / 155

13.4.1 Privacy in a Vehicle Network / 155

13.4.2 Privacy Threats in Consumer Vehicle Networks / 156

13.4.3 How Driver Privacy can be Breached Today / 158

13.5 Basic Security Capabilities / 159

13.5.1 Authentication / 159

13.5.2 Misbehavior Detection and Revocation / 160

13.5.3 Data Integrity / 160

13.5.4 Data Confidentiality / 160

13.6 Privacy Protections Capabilities / 161

13.7 Design and Performance Considerations / 161

13.7.1 Scalability / 162

13.7.2 Balancing Competing Requirements / 162

13.7.3 Minimal Side Effects / 163

13.7.4 Quantifi able Levels of Security and Privacy / 163

13.7.5 Adaptability / 163

13.7.6 Security and Privacy Protection for V2V Broadcast / 163

13.7.7 Security and Privacy Protection for Communications with Security Servers / 164

References / 165

14 Cryptographic Mechanisms 167

14.1 Introduction / 167

14.2 Categories of Cryptographic Mechanisms / 167

14.2.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions / 168

14.2.2 Symmetric Key Algorithms / 169

14.2.3 Public Key (Asymmetric Key) Algorithms / 170

14.3 Digital Signature Algorithms / 172

14.3.1 The RSA Algorithm / 172

14.3.2 The DSA Algorithm / 178

14.3.3 The ECDSA Algorithm / 184

14.3.4 ECDSA for Vehicle Safety Communications / 194

14.4 Message Authentication and Message Integrity Verifi cation / 196

14.4.1 Authentication and Integrity Verifi cation Using Hash Functions / 197

14.4.2 Authentication and Integrity Verifi cation Using Digital Signatures / 198

14.5 Diffi e–Hellman Key Establishment Protocol / 200

14.5.1 The Original Diffie–Hellman Key Establishment Protocol / 200

14.5.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Key Establishment Protocol / 201

14.6 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) / 202

14.6.1 The Basic Idea / 202

14.6.2 Scheme Setup / 202

14.6.3 Encrypt a Message / 202

14.6.4 Decrypt a Message / 204

14.6.5 Performance / 204

References / 206

15 Public Key Infrastructure for Vehicle Networks 209

15.1 Introduction / 209

15.2 Public Key Certificates / 210

15.3 Message Authentication with Certificates / 211

15.4 Certifi cate Revocation List / 212

15.5 A Baseline Reference Vehicular PKI Model / 213

15.6 Confi gure Initial Security Parameters and Assign Initial Certificates / 215

15.6.1 Vehicles Create Their Private and Public Keys / 216

15.6.2 Certificate Authority Creates Private and Public Keys for Vehicles / 217

15.7 Acquire New Keys and Certifi cates / 217

15.8 Distribute Certifi cates to Vehicles for Signature Verifications / 220

15.9 Detect Misused Certifi cates and Misbehaving Vehicles / 222

15.9.1 Local Misbehavior Detection / 223

15.9.2 Global Misbehavior Detection / 224

15.9.3 Misbehavior Reporting / 224

15.10 Ways for Vehicles to Acquire CRLs / 226

15.11 How Often CRLs should be Distributed to Vehicles? / 228

15.12 PKI Hierarchy / 230

15.12.1 Certifi cate Chaining to Enable Hierarchical CAs / 231

15.12.2 Hierarchical CA Architecture Example / 231

15.13 Privacy-Preserving Vehicular PKI / 233

15.13.1 Quantitative Measurements of Vehicle Anonymity / 234

15.13.2 Quantitative Measurement of Message Unlinkability / 234

References / 235

16 Privacy Protection with Shared Certificates 237

16.1 Shared Certificates / 237

16.2 The Combinatorial Certificate Scheme / 237

16.3 Certificate Revocation Collateral Damage / 239

16.4 Certified Intervals / 242

16.4.1 The Concept of Certified Interval / 242

16.4.2 Certified Interval Produced by the Original Combinatorial Certificate Scheme / 242

16.5 Reduce Collateral Damage and Improve Certified Interval / 244

16.5.1 Reduce Collateral Damage Caused by a Single Misused Certificate / 245

16.5.2 Vehicles Become Statistically Distinguishable When Misusing Multiple Certificates / 248

16.5.3 The Dynamic Reward Algorithm / 250

16.6 Privacy in Low Vehicle Density Areas / 253

16.6.1 The Problem / 253

16.6.2 The Blend-In Algorithm to Improve Privacy / 256

References / 259

17 Privacy Protection with Short-Lived Unique Certificates 260

17.1 Short-Lived Unique Certificates / 260

17.2 The Basic Short-Lived Certificate Scheme / 261

17.3 The Problem of Large CRL / 263

17.4 Anonymously Linked Certificates to Reduce CRL Size / 264

17.4.1 Certificate Tags / 264

17.4.2 CRL Processing by Vehicles / 265

17.4.3 Backward Unlinkability / 267

17.5 Reduce CRL Search Time / 268

17.6 Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates / 269

17.7 Reduce the Volume of Certificate Request and Response Messages / 270

17.8 Determine the Number of Certificates for Each Vehicle / 270

References / 273

18 Privacy Protection with Group Signatures 274

18.1 Group Signatures / 274

18.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge / 275

18.3 The ACJT Group Signature Scheme and its Extensions / 277

18.3.1 The ACJT Group Signature Scheme / 277

18.3.2 The Challenge of Group Membership Revocation / 282

18.3.3 ACJT Extensions to Support Membership Revocation / 283

18.4 The CG Group Signature Scheme with Revocation / 286

18.5 The Short Group Signatures Scheme / 288

18.5.1 The Short Group Signatures Scheme / 288

18.5.2 Membership Revocation / 291

18.6 Group Signature Schemes with Verifier-Local Revocation / 292

References / 293

19 Privacy Protection against Certificate Authorities 295

19.1 Introduction / 295

19.2 Basic Idea / 295

19.3 Baseline Split CA Architecture, Protocol, and Message Processing / 297

19.4 Split CA Architecture for Shared Certifi cates / 301

19.5 Split CA Architecture for Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates / 302

19.5.1 Acquire One Unlinked Certifi cate at a Time / 302

19.5.2 Assign Batches of Unlinked Short-Lived Certifi cates / 304

19.5.3 Revoke Batches of Unlinked Certifi cates / 306

19.5.4 Request for Decryption Keys for Certificate Batches / 307

19.6 Split CA Architecture for Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates / 308

19.6.1 Assign One Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificate at a Time / 308

19.6.2 Assign Batches of Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates / 311

19.6.3 Revoke Batches of Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates / 312

19.6.4 Request for Decryption Keys for Certificate Batches / 313

References / 314

20 Comparison of Privacy-Preserving Certificate Management Schemes 315

20.1 Introduction / 315

20.2 Comparison of Main Characteristics / 316

20.3 Misbehavior Detection / 320

20.4 Abilities to Prevent Privacy Abuse by CA and MDS Operators / 321

20.5 Summary / 322

21 IEEE 1609.2 Security Services 323

21.1 Introduction / 323

21.2 The IEEE 1609.2 Standard / 323

21.3 Certificates and Certificate Authority Hierarchy / 325

21.4 Formats for Public Key, Signature, Certificate, and CRL / 327

21.4.1 Public Key Formats / 327

21.4.2 Signature Formats / 328

21.4.3 Certificate Format / 329

21.4.4 CRL Format / 332

21.5 Message Formats and Processing for Generating Encrypted Messages / 333

21.6 Sending Messages / 335

21.7 Request Certifi cates from the CA / 336

21.8 Request and Processing CRL / 343

21.9 What the Current IEEE 1609.2 Standard Does Not Cover / 344

21.9.1 No Support for Anonymous Message Authentication / 344

21.9.2 Separate Vehicle-CA Communication Protocols Are Required / 344

21.9.3 Interactions and Interfaces between CA Entities Not Addressed / 346

References / 346

22 4G for Vehicle Safety Communications 347

22.1 Introduction / 347

22.2 Long-Term Revolution (LTE) / 347

22.3 LTE for Vehicle Safety Communications / 353

22.3.1 Issues to Be Addressed / 353

22.3.2 LTE for V2I Safety Communications / 353

22.3.3 LTE for V2V Safety Communications / 356

22.3.4 LTE Broadcast and Multicast Services / 357

References / 358

Glossary 360

Index 367

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