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| Preface | p. xii |
| Acknowledgements | p. xv |
| List of figures | p. xvii |
| List of tables | p. xix |
| List of most common acronyms | p. xx |
| What is the philosophy of information? | p. 1 |
| Summary | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Philosophy of artificial intelligence as a premature paradigm of PI | p. 2 |
| The historical emergence of PI | p. 5... MORE |
| The dialectic of reflection and the emergence of PI | p. 7 |
| The definition of PI | p. 13 |
| The analytic approach to PI | p. 17 |
| The metaphysical approach to PI | p. 19 |
| PI as philosophia prima | p. 24 |
| Conclusion | p. 25 |
| Open problems in the philosophy of information | p. 26 |
| Summary | p. 26 |
| Introduction | p. 26 |
| David Hilbert's view | p. 28 |
| Analysis | p. 30 |
| Semantics | p. 33 |
| Intelligence | p. 35 |
| Nature | p. 42 |
| Values | p. 44 |
| Conclusion | p. 45 |
| The method of levels of abstraction | p. 46 |
| Summary | p. 46 |
| Introduction | p. 47 |
| Some definitions and preliminary examples | p. 48 |
| Typed variable | p. 48 |
| Observable | p. 48 |
| Six examples | p. 49 |
| Levels of abstraction | p. 52 |
| Behaviour | p. 53 |
| Gradient of abstraction | p. 54 |
| A classic interpretation of the method of abstraction | p. 58 |
| Some philosophical applications | p. 60 |
| Agents | p. 60 |
| The Turing test | p. 61 |
| Turing's imitation game | p. 61 |
| Turing's test revisited | p. 62 |
| Turing discussed | p. 63 |
| Emergence | p. 63 |
| Artificial life | p. 65 |
| Quantum observation | p. 66 |
| Decidable observation | p. 66 |
| Simulation and functionalism | p. 67 |
| The philosophy of the method of abstraction | p. 68 |
| Levels of organization and of explanation | p. 69 |
| Conceptual schemes | p. 71 |
| Pluralism without relativism | p. 74 |
| Realism without descriptivism | p. 75 |
| Constructionism | p. 76 |
| Conclusion | p. 78 |
| Semantic information and the veridicality thesis | p. 80 |
| Summary | p. 80 |
| Introduction | p. 80 |
| The data-based approach to semantic infomiation | p. 82 |
| The general definition of information | p. 83 |
| Understanding data | p. 85 |
| Taxonomic neutrality | p. 86 |
| Typological neutrality | p. 87 |
| Ontological neutrality | p. 90 |
| Genetic neutrality | p. 91 |
| Alethic neutrality | p. 92 |
| Why false information is not a kind of semantic information | p. 93 |
| Why false information is pseudo-information: Attributive vs predicative use | p. 97 |
| Why false information is pseudo-information: A semantic argument | p. 98 |
| First step: Too much infomiation | p. 99 |
| Second step: Excluding tautologies | p. 100 |
| Third step: Excluding contradictions | p. 100 |
| Fourth step: Excluding inconsistencies | p. 101 |
| Last step: Only contingently true propositions count as semantic infomiation | p. 103 |
| The definition of semantic information | p. 104 |
| Conclusion | p. 106 |
| Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information | p. 108 |
| Summary | p. 108 |
| Introduction | p. 109 |
| The Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox | p. 111 |
| Three criteria of information equivalence | p. 114 |
| Three desiderata for TSSI | p. 117 |
| Degrees of vacuity and inaccuracy | p. 117 |
| Degrees of informativeness | p. 123 |
| Quantities of vacuity and of semantic information | p. 125 |
| The solution of the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox | p. 127 |
| TSSI and the scandal of deduction | p. 129 |
| Conclusion | p. 132 |
| The symbol grounding problem | p. 134 |
| Summary | p. 134 |
| Introduction | p. 134 |
| The symbol grounding problem | p. 136 |
| The representationalist approach | p. 137 |
| A hybrid model for the solution of the SGP | p. 138 |
| SGP and the symbolic theft hypothesis | p. 142 |
| A functional model for the solution of the SGP | p. 143 |
| An intentional model for the solution of the SGP | p. 144 |
| Clarion | p. 146 |
| The semi-representationalist approach | p. 149 |
| An epistemological model for the solution of the SGP | p. 149 |
| The physical symbol grounding problem | p. 150 |
| A model based on temporal delays and predictive semantics for the solution of the SGP | p. 153 |
| The non-representationalist approach | p. 155 |
| A communication-based model for the solution of the SGP | p. 156 |
| A behaviour-based model for the solution of the SGP | p. 157 |
| Emulative learning and the rejection of representations | p. 159 |
| Conclusion | p. 160 |
| Action-based semantics | p. 162 |
| Summary | p. 162 |
| Introduction | p. 162 |
| Action-based Semantics | p. 164 |
| Two-machine artificial agents and their AbS | p. 166 |
| Three controversial aspects of AM2 | p. 172 |
| Learning and performing rule through Hebb's rule and local selection | p. 173 |
| From grounded symbols to grounded communication and abstractions | p. 176 |
| Conclusion | p. 179 |
| Semantic information and the correctness theory of truth | p. 182 |
| Summary | p. 182 |
| Introduction | p. 183 |
| First step: Translation | p. 186 |
| Second step: Polarization | p. 188 |
| Third step: Normalization | p. 190 |
| Fourth step: Verification and validation | p. 193 |
| Fifth step: Correctness | p. 195 |
| Some implications and advantages of the correctness theory of truth | p. 199 |
| Truthmakers and coherentism | p. 199 |
| Accessibility, bidimensionalism, and correspondentism | p. 201 |
| Types of semantic information and the variety of truths | p. 203 |
| A deflationist interpretation of falsehood as failure | p. 205 |
| The information-inaptness of semantic paradoxes | p. 205 |
| Conclusion | p. 208 |
| The logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem | p. 209 |
| Summary | p. 209 |
| Introduction | p. 210 |
| Why the Gettier problem is unsolvable in principle | p. 212 |
| Three objections and replies | p. 217 |
| Conclusion | p. 222 |
| The logic of being informed | p. 224 |
| Summary | p. 224 |
| Introduction | p. 224 |
| Three logics of information | p. 226 |
| Modelling 'being informed' | p. 228 |
| IL satisfies A1, A2, A3, A5 | p. 229 |
| Consistency and truth: IL satisfies A9 and A4 | p. 230 |
| No reflectivity: IL does not satisfy A6, A8 | p. 232 |
| Transmissibility: IL satisfies A10 and A11 | p. 236 |
| Constructing the Information Base: IL satisfies A7 | p. 236 |
| KTB-IL | p. 237 |
| Four epistemological implications of KTB-IL | p. 238 |
| Information overload in KTB-IL | p. 238 |
| In favour of the veridicality thesis | p. 239 |
| The relations between DL, IL and EL | p. 240 |
| Against the untouchable | p. 241 |
| Conclusion | p. 243 |
| Understanding epistemic relevance | p. 244 |
| Summary | p. 244 |
| Introduction | p. 245 |
| Epistemic vs causal relevance | p. 246 |
| The basic case | p. 249 |
| Advantages of the basic case | p. 249 |
| Limits of the basic case | p. 251 |
| A probabilistic revision of the basic case | p. 251 |
| Advantages of the probabilistic revision | p. 252 |
| Limits of the probabilistic revision | p. 252 |
| A counterfactual revision of the probabilistic analysis | p. 253 |
| Advantages of the counterfactual revision | p. 253 |
| Limits of the counterfactual revision | p. 253 |
| A metatheoretical revision of the counterfactual analysis | p. 254 |
| Advantages of the metatheoretical revision | p. 256 |
| Some illustrative cases | p. 257 |
| Misinformation cannot be relevant | p. 260 |
| Two objections and replies | p. 261 |
| Completeness: No relevant semantic information for semantically unable agents | p. 261 |
| Soundness: Rationality does not presuppose relevance | p. 262 |
| Conclusion | p. 265 |
| Semantic information and the network theory of account | p. 267 |
| Summary | p. 267 |
| Introduction | p. 268 |
| The nature of the upgrading problem: Mutual independence | p. 268 |
| Solving the upgrading problem: The network theory of account | p. 274 |
| Advantages of a network theory of account | p. 279 |
| Testing the network theory of account | p. 284 |
| Conclusion | p. 288 |
| Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game | p. 290 |
| Summary | p. 290 |
| Introduction | p. 290 |
| The knowledge game | p. 296 |
| The first and classic version of the knowledge game: Externally inferable states | p. 297 |
| Synchronic inferences: A fairer version of the knowledge game | p. 298 |
| Winners of the classic version | p. 300 |
| The second version of the knowledge game | p. 301 |
| The third version of the knowledge game | p. 302 |
| The fourth version of the knowledge game | p. 307 |
| Dretske's question and the knowledge game | p. 309 |
| Conclusion | p. 313 |
| Against digital ontology | p. 316 |
| Summary | p. 316 |
| Introduction | p. 316 |
| What is digital ontology? It from Bit | p. 317 |
| Digital ontology: From physical to metaphysical problems | p. 320 |
| The thought experiment | p. 325 |
| Stage 1: Reality in itself is digital or analogue | p. 327 |
| Stage 2: The stubborn legacy of the analogue | p. 329 |
| Stage 3: The observer's analysis | p. 330 |
| Digital and analogue are features of the level of abstraction | p. 332 |
| Three objections and replies | p. 334 |
| Conclusion | p. 337 |
| A defence of informational structural realism | p. 339 |
| Summary | p. 339 |
| Introduction | p. 340 |
| First step: ESR and OSR are not incompatible | p. 344 |
| Indirect knowledge | p. 345 |
| Structuralism and the levels of abstraction | p. 347 |
| Ontological commitments and levels of abstractions | p. 348 |
| How to reconcile ESR and OSR | p. 349 |
| Second step: Relata are not logically prior to all relations | p. 353 |
| Third step: The concept of a structural object is not empty | p. 355 |
| Informational structural realism | p. 360 |
| Ten objections and replies | p. 361 |
| Conclusion | p. 369 |
| References | p. 372 |
| Index | p. 401 |
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