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Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

by: Bennett, M. R.; Hacker, P. M. S.

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

by: Bennett, M. R.; Hacker, P. M. S.

ISBN 13:
9781405108386
ISBN 10:
140510838X
Edition: 1st
Format: Paperback
Copyright: 04/18/2003
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Summary

In this work, two distinguished figures from neuroscience and philosophy present a detailed critical survey of the philosophical foundations of cognitive neuroscience.

Foreword

xiii

Acknowledgements

xvii

Introduction

(8)

Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots

(100)

The Early Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System

(32)

Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine

(11)

Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine

(7)

The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and its Aftermath

(3)

The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall

(5)

Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig

(3)

The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington

(2)

The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and his Proteges

(25)

Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact

(4)

Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism

(2)

John Eccles and the `Liaison Brain'

(8)

Wilder Penfield and the `Highest Brain Mechanism'

(11)

The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience

(41)

Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird)

(6)

Methodological Qualms (Ullman, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry)

(7)

On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being

(4)

On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)

(3)

The Inner (Damasio)

(2)

Introspection (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)

(2)

Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect (Blakemore)

(2)

Privacy or Subjectivity (Searle)

(3)

The Meaning of Psychological Predicates and How they are Learnt

(6)

Of the Mind and its Nature (Gazzaniga, Doty)

103

(6)

Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis

109

(2)

Preliminaries

111

(126)

Brain--Body Dualism

111

(3)

The Project

114

(3)

The Category of the Psychological

117

(4)

Sensation and Perception

121

(27)

Sensation (Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)

121

(4)

Perception (Crick)

125

(23)

Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities (Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)

128

(7)

Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)

135

(2)

Visual images and the binding problem (Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)

137

(6)

Perception as information processing: Marr's theory of vision (Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)

143

(5)

The Cognitive Powers

148

(24)

Knowledge and its Kinship with Ability

148

(6)

Being able to and Knowing how to

149

(2)

Possessing Knowledge and Containing Knowledge (LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga)

151

(3)

Memory (Milner Squire and Kandel)

154

(18)

Declarative and non-declarative memory (Milner, Squire and Kandel)

155

(3)

Storage, retention and memory traces (LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga, Mangun and Ivry; James, Kohler, Glynn; Bennett Gibson, and Robinson; Damasio)

158

(14)

The Cogitative Powers

172

(27)

Belief (Crick)

172

(3)

Thinking

175

(5)

Imagination and Mental Images (Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard)

180

(19)

The logical features of mental imagery (Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle)

187

(12)

Emotion

199

(25)

Affections (Rolls, Damasio)

199

(4)

The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey

203

(21)

Neuroscientists' confusions (LeDoux, Damasio, James)

207

(9)

Analysis of the emotions

216

(8)

Volition and Voluntary Movement

224

(13)

Volition

224

(4)

Libet's Theory of Voluntary Movement (Libet, Frith et al.)

228

(3)

Taking Stock

231

(6)

Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis

237

(116)

Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness

239

(22)

Consciousness and the Brain (Albright, Jessell, Kandel and Posner, Edelman and Tononi; Glynn, Greenfield, Llinas, Gazzaniga, Searle, Johnson-Laird, Chalmers, Dennett, Gregory, Crick and Koch, Frisby)

239

(5)

Intransitive Consciousness (Searle, Dennett)

244

(4)

Transitive Consciousness and its Forms

248

(5)

Transitive Consciousness: A Partial Analysis

253

(8)

Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia

261

(32)

Extending the Concept of Consciousness (Libet, Baars, Crick, Edelman, Searle, Chalmers)

261

(2)

Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States

263

(8)

Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain (Searle, Baars)

268

(3)

Qualia (Searle, Chalmers, Glynn, Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Nagel, Dennett)

271

(22)

`How it feels' to have an experience (Searle, Edelman and Tononi, Chalmers)

274

(3)

Of there being something which it is like . . . (Nagel)

277

(4)

The qualitative character of experience

281

(1)

Thises and thuses (Chalmers, Crick)

282

(2)

Of the communicability and describability of qualia (Nagel, Edelman, Glynn, Sperry)

284

(9)

Puzzles about Consciousness

293

(30)

A Budget of Puzzles

293

(1)

On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with our Conception of an Objective Reality (Searle, Chalmers, Dennett, Penrose)

294

(8)

On the Question of how Physical Processes can give rise to Conscious Experience (Huxley, Tyndall, Humphrey, Glynn, Edelman, Damasio)

302

(5)

Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness (Chalmers, Barlow, Penrose, Humphrey, Searle)

307

(7)

The Problem of Awareness (Johnson-Laird, Blakemore)

314

(2)

Other Minds and Other Animals (Crick, Edelman, Weiskrantz, Baars)

316

(7)

Self-Consciousness

323

(30)

Self-Consciousness and the Self

323

(1)

Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James

324

(4)

Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness (Damasio, Edelman, Humphrey, Blakemore, Johnson-Laird)

328

(3)

The Illusion of a `Self' (Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore)

331

(3)

The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection

334

(12)

Thought and language (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Galton, Penrose)

337

(9)

Self-Consciousness (Edelman, Penrose)

346

(7)

Part IV On Method

353

(58)

Reductionism

355

(23)

Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism (Crick, Blakemore)

355

(11)

Reduction by Elimination (P. M. and P. S. Churchland)

366

(12)

Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? (P. M. Churchland)

367

(3)

Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? (P. M. Churchland)

370

(2)

Eliminating all that is human (P. M. and P. S. Churchland, Dawkins)

372

(4)

Sawing off the branch on which one sits

376

(2)

Methodological Reflections

378

(33)

Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation (P. S. Churchland)

379

(7)

The `Poverty of English' Argument (Blakemore)

386

(2)

From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy (Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty)

388

(8)

The case of blind-sight: misdescription and illusory explanation (Weiskrantz)

393

(3)

Philosophy and Neuroscience (Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki)

396

(12)

What philosophy can and what it cannot do

399

(6)

What neuroscience can and what it cannot do (Crick, Edelman, Zeki)

405

(3)

Why it Matters

408

(3)

Appendices

411

(42)

Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett

413

(23)

1 Dennett's Methodology and Presuppositions

415

(4)

2 The Intentional Stance

419

(8)

3 Heterophenomenological Method

427

(4)

4 Consciousness

431

(5)

Appendix 2 John Searle

436

(17)

1 Philosophy and Science

436

(7)

2 Searle's Philosophy of Mind

443

(6)

3 The Traditional Mind-Body Problem

449

(4)

Index

453

Amazon no longer offers textbook rentals. We do!

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

9781405108386

140510838X

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

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