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| Acknowledgments | p. xi |
| Abbreviations | p. xv |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| The Evolution of Terrorism as a Strategic Threat | p. 3 |
| A Word About Scope and Terms | p. 6 |
| The Conceptual Framework | p. 7 |
| Case Selection | p. 8 |
| Overview of Chapters | p. 9 |
| Decapitation: Catching or Killing the Leader | p. 14 |
| what decapitation Means | p. ... MORE |
| The Arrest of Top Leaders | p. 17 |
| Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) | p. 18 |
| Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | p. 20 |
| Mickey McKevitt and the Real Irish Republican Army | p. 22 |
| Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo | p. 23 |
| Assassination or "Targeted Killing" | p. 24 |
| The Philippines' Abu Sayyaf | p. 27 |
| Russia and Chechen Leaders | p. 28 |
| Israel's "Targeted Killings" | p. 29 |
| How Decapitation Ends Terrorism | p. 31 |
| Negotiations: Transition toward a Legitimate Political Process | p. 35 |
| why Government Negotiate | p. 36 |
| Why Groups Negotiate | p. 39 |
| Case Studies of Negotiations | p. 42 |
| The Northern Ireland Peace Process | p. 42 |
| Analysis of the Agreement | p. 47 |
| The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process | p. 48 |
| Terrorism and the Talks | p. 55 |
| The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers) | p. 57 |
| Analysis of the Failure | p. 61 |
| Promising and Unpromising Circumstances for Negotiation | p. 62 |
| Stalemate | p. 63 |
| Strong Leadership | p. 64 |
| Sponsors | p. 65 |
| Suicide Campaigns | p. 66 |
| Splintering | p. 67 |
| Spoilers | p. 69 |
| Setting and Story | p. 70 |
| How Negotiations End Terrorism | p. 71 |
| Success: Achieving the Objective | p. 73 |
| What Does "Success" Mean? | p. 74 |
| Survival | p. 75 |
| Achievement of Objectives | p. 77 |
| Perpetuating Terrorism: Tactical or "Process" Goals | p. 77 |
| Ending Terrorism: Strategic or"Outcome" Goals | p. 80 |
| Cases of Success | p. 82 |
| Irgun Zvai Le'umi (Irgun or IZL) | p. 82 |
| The African National Congress and Umkhonto | p. 85 |
| Other Notable Cases | p. 89 |
| How Success Ends Terrorism | p. 91 |
| Conclusion | p. 92 |
| Failure: Imploding, Provoking a Backlash, or Becoming Marginalized | p. 94 |
| Implosion: Mistakes, Burnout, and Collapse | p. 95 |
| Failure to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation | p. 95 |
| Generational Patterns: Left-Wing Groups In The 1970S | p. 97 |
| Generational Patterns: Right-Wing Groups In The 1990S | p. 98 |
| Infighting and Fractionalization | p. 100 |
| Loss of Operational Control | p. 102 |
| Accepting an Exit | p. 103 |
| Marginalization: Diminishing Popular Support | p. 104 |
| The Ideology Becomes Irrelevant | p. 105 |
| Loss of Contact with "the People" | p. 107 |
| Targeting Errors and Backlash | p. 108 |
| How Failure Ends Terrorism | p. 110 |
| Repression: Crushing Terrorism with Force | p. 115 |
| Analyzing The Strategies of Terrorism | p. 117 |
| Case Studies of Repression | p. 122 |
| Russia and Narodnaya Volya | p. 123 |
| Peru and Sendero Luminoso | p. 125 |
| Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | p. 128 |
| Uruguay and the Tupamaros | p. 129 |
| Russia and Chechnya | p. 131 |
| Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1966 | p. 137 |
| How Repression Ends Terrorism | p. 141 |
| Reorientation: Transitioning to Another Modus Operandi | p. 146 |
| Criminality and Terrorism | p. 148 |
| Colombia and the FARC | p. 149 |
| The Philippines and Abu Sayyaf | p. 152 |
| Insurgency and Terrorism | p. 153 |
| Algeria and the G1A | p. 155 |
| Terrorism as a Catalyst for Major War | p. 157 |
| India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Separatist Groups | p. 159 |
| Outdates Paradigms, Practical Implications | p. 162 |
| How War Ends Terrorism | p. 166 |
| How Al-Qaeda Ends: The Relevance and Irrelevance of History | p. 167 |
| Is Al-Qaeda Unique? | p. 168 |
| Resilient Structure | p. 169 |
| Methods of Radicalization and Recruitment | p. 171 |
| Means of Support | p. 174 |
| Means of Communication | p. 175 |
| The Relevance and Irrelevance of History for Al-Qaeda: Applying the Framework | p. 177 |
| Decapitation:Capturing or Killing the Leaders | p. 177 |
| Negotiations: Talking to Al-Qaeda or Its Associates | p. 179 |
| Success: Achieving Al-Qaeda's Objectives | p. 182 |
| Failure through Implosion | p. 183 |
| Failure through Diminishment of Popular Support | p. 187 |
| Repression: Crushing Al-Qaeda with Force | p. 190 |
| Reorientation: Transitioning to Other Means | p. 191 |
| Al-Qaeda's Decline and Demise | p. 193 |
| Conclusion | p. 197 |
| Understanding How Terrorism Ends | p. 201 |
| Appendix: Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns | p. 207 |
| Notes | p. 223 |
| Selected Bibliography | p. 283 |
| Index | p. 297 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |