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| Tables and Figures | p. xi |
| Preface | p. xiii |
| Bureaucracies as Policymaking Organizations | p. 1 |
| The Contours of Public Bureaucracy | p. 6 |
| Accountability and Performance in Public Bureaucracies | p. 7 |
| Accountability and its Many Faces | p. 12 |
| The Evolution of Accountability | p. 14 |
| The Limits of Accountability | p. 15 |
| The Push for Performance | ... MORE |
| The Government Performance and Results Act | p. 19 |
| The Program Assessment Rating Tool | p. 21 |
| Agency Reputations in the Real World | p. 23 |
| Accountability and Performance: Theories and Applications | p. 25 |
| Bureaucratic Reasoning | p. 34 |
| The Bounded Rationality Model | p. 37 |
| Simplified Problem Solving | p. 40 |
| Problem Disaggregation | p. 41 |
| Standard Operating Procedures | p. 42 |
| Sunk Costs | p. 46 |
| Simulations and Tests | p. 47 |
| Evidence-Based Research | p. 48 |
| Implications for Policy Analysis | p. 49 |
| Motivation | p. 51 |
| Empathy and Commitment | p. 51 |
| Representative Bureaucracy | p. 53 |
| Money as a Motivator | p. 54 |
| Attitudes toward Risk | p. 55 |
| Organizational Advancement | p. 56 |
| Promoting Organizational Cohesion | p. 58 |
| Consequences of Bounded Rationality | p. 60 |
| A Narrow Search | p. 60 |
| Problem Disaggregation | p. 61 |
| Approximations | p. 63 |
| Standard Operating Procedures | p. 63 |
| Conclusion | p. 65 |
| The Bureaucracy's Bosses | p. 71 |
| Delegation, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard | p. 73 |
| Why Bureaucracy? | p. 76 |
| Why Delegation Varies | p. 78 |
| Implementing Child Care Legislation | p. 81 |
| Managing Delegation | p. 83 |
| Presidential Power | p. 84 |
| Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy | p. 95 |
| Judicial Review | p. 103 |
| Principal-Agent Theory and the Bureaucracy's Clients | p. 108 |
| Principals and Principles | p. 109 |
| The Bureaucracy's Clients | p. 117 |
| The Benefits, Costs, and Politics of Public Policy | p. 119 |
| The Rise and Fall of Iron Triangles | p. 122 |
| The Venues of Client Participation | p. 127 |
| The Notice and Comment Process | p. 127 |
| Advisory Committees and Other Venues of Collaboration | p. 130 |
| Political Intervention | p. 133 |
| Client Participation and the Internet | p. 134 |
| Client Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking | p. 139 |
| Business Organizations | p. 141 |
| Public Interest Groups | p. 143 |
| State and Local Governments | p. 145 |
| Clients and the Institutions of Government | p. 148 |
| Client Participation: Three Lessons and Beyond | p. 149 |
| Who Participates Varies | p. 149 |
| Venues Vary | p. 150 |
| Influence Varies | p. 150 |
| Bureaucratic Networks | p. 158 |
| Networks versus Hierarchies | p. 161 |
| Network Theory | p. 162 |
| The Tools Approach | p. 165 |
| Types of Bureaucratic Networks | p. 167 |
| Intergovernmental Relationships | p. 167 |
| Environmental Protection | p. 168 |
| Health Policy | p. 172 |
| Race to the Top in Education | p. 176 |
| Welfare Reform | p. 177 |
| Public-Private Partnerships | p. 177 |
| Contracting Out | p. 178 |
| Partnerships without Contracts | p. 181 |
| Interagency Networks | p. 183 |
| The Cabinet | p. 184 |
| Office of Management and Budget | p. 185 |
| Interagency Coordination | p. 186 |
| Czars | p. 189 |
| Network Effectiveness | p. 194 |
| The Effectiveness of Policy Tools | p. 195 |
| Grants-in-Aid | p. 195 |
| Regulation | p. 198 |
| Information | p. 199 |
| Networks and Public Bureaucracy | p. 201 |
| The Politics of Disaster Management | p. 212 |
| The Gulf of Mexico: Two Crises with Precedent | p. 214 |
| Hurricane Katrina | p. 214 |
| FEMA's Evolution | p. 215 |
| Katrina Strikes | p. 218 |
| Applying the Theories | p. 220 |
| The Coast Guard and Other Success Stories | p. 224 |
| The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill | p. 226 |
| Bounded Rationality on the Deepwater Horizon | p. 227 |
| Networks and Oil Exploration | p. 228 |
| The Minerals Management Service: A Problematic Principal | p. 230 |
| Of Booms, Berms, and Client Politics | p. 232 |
| September 11, 2001: A Crisis without Precedent | p. 236 |
| The First Response | p. 237 |
| Bureaucracy after 9/11 | p. 239 |
| The Iraq War and the Intelligence Community | p. 242 |
| Bureaucratic Theories and the Politics of Homeland Security | p. 244 |
| Avian Influenza: A Crisis in the Making? | p. 248 |
| National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza | p. 250 |
| Using the Theories to Forecast | p. 252 |
| Evaluating Bureaucracy in Light of the Theories | p. 256 |
| Why are Some Bureaucracies Better than Others? | p. 267 |
| Rating the Performance of Agencies | p. 268 |
| Explaining Variations in Performance | p. 269 |
| Tasks | p. 270 |
| Relationships | p. 275 |
| Political Support | p. 277 |
| Leadership | p. 281 |
| Alternative Rating Systems | p. 285 |
| Bureaucracy in the Twenty-First Century | p. 287 |
| Web Resources | p. 295 |
| Index | p. 299 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |