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An Introduction to Game Theory

ISBN: 9780195128956 | 0195128958
Format: Hardcover
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Pub. Date: 8/7/2003

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SummaryTable of Contents
Martin J. Osborne is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto.
Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are d... MORE
Prefacexi
Introduction
1(10)
What is game theory?
1(3)
... MORE
An outline of the history of game theory
2(1)
John von Neumann
3(1)
The theory of rational choice
4(3)
Coming attractions: interacting decision-makers
7(4)
Notes
9(2)
I Games with Perfect Information
11(260)
Nash Equilibrium: Theory
13(42)
Strategic games
13(1)
Example: the Prisoner's Dilemma
14(4)
Example: Bach or Stravinsky?
18(1)
Example: Matching Pennies
19(1)
Example: the Stag Hunt
20(1)
Nash equilibrium
21(5)
John F. Nash, Jr.
23(1)
Studying Nash equilibrium experimentally
24(2)
Examples of Nash equilibrium
26(9)
Experimental evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma
28(4)
Focal points
32(3)
Best response functions
35(10)
Dominated actions
45(5)
Equilibrium in a single population: symmetric games and symmetric equilibria
50(5)
Notes
53(2)
Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations
55(44)
Cournot's model of oligopoly
55(8)
Bertrand's model of oligopoly
63(7)
Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: some historical notes
69(1)
Electoral competition
70(7)
The War of Attrition
77(3)
Auctions
80(11)
Auctions from Babylonia to eBay
81(10)
Accident law
91(8)
Notes
97(2)
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
99(54)
Introduction
99(7)
Some evidence on expected payoff functions
104(2)
Strategic games in which players may randomize
106(1)
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
107(13)
Dominated actions
120(2)
Pure equilibria when randomization is allowed
122(1)
Illustration: expert diagnosis
123(5)
Equilibrium in a single population
128(3)
Illustration: reporting a crime
131(3)
Reporting a crime: social psychology and game theory
133(1)
The formation of players' beliefs
134(3)
Extension: finding all mixed strategy Nash equilibria
137(5)
Extension: games in which each player has a continuum of actions
142(4)
Appendix: representing preferences by expected payoffs
146(7)
Notes
150(3)
Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
153(28)
Extensive games with perfect information
153(6)
Strategies and outcomes
159(2)
Nash equilibrium
161(3)
Subgame perfect equilibrium
164(5)
Finding subgame perfect equilibria of finite horizon games: backward induction
169(12)
Ticktacktoe, chess, and related games
178(1)
Notes
179(2)
Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Illustrations
181(24)
The ultimatum game, the holdup game, and agenda control
181(6)
Experiments on the ultimatum game
183(4)
Stackelberg's model of duopoly
187(5)
Buying votes
192(5)
A race
197(8)
Notes
203(2)
Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion
205(34)
Allowing for simultaneous moves
205(8)
More experimental evidence on subgame perfect equilibrium
211(2)
Illustration: entry into a monopolized industry
213(2)
Illustration: electoral competition with strategic voters
215(2)
Illustration: committee decision-making
217(4)
Illustration: exit from a declining industry
221(4)
Allowing for exogenous uncertainty
225(6)
Discussion: subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
231(5)
Experimental evidence on the centipede game
234(2)
Notes
236(3)
Coalitional Games and the Core
239(32)
Coalitional games
239(4)
The core
243(4)
Illustration: ownership and the distribution of wealth
247(4)
Illustration: exchanging homogeneous horses
251(5)
Illustration: exchanging heterogeneous houses
256(4)
Illustration: voting
260(3)
Illustration: matching
263(6)
Matching doctors with hospitals
268(1)
Discussion: other solution concepts
269(2)
Notes
270(1)
II Games with Imperfect Information
271(88)
Bayesian Games
273(40)
Motivational examples
273(5)
General definitions
278(4)
Two examples concerning information
282(3)
Illustration: Cournot's duopoly game with imperfect information
285(4)
Illustration: providing a public good
289(2)
Illustration: auctions
291(10)
Auctions of the radio spectrum
300(1)
Illustration: juries
301(6)
Appendix: auctions with an arbitrary distribution of valuations
307(6)
Notes
311(2)
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
313(46)
Extensive games with imperfect information
313(4)
Strategies
317(1)
Nash equilibrium
318(5)
Beliefs and sequential equilibrium
323(8)
Signaling games
331(5)
Illustration: conspicuous expenditure as a signal of quality
336(4)
Illustration: education as a signal of ability
340(3)
Illustration: strategic information transmission
343(8)
Illustration: agenda control with imperfect information
351(8)
Notes
357(2)
III Variants and Extensions
359(148)
Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization
361(16)
Maxminimization
361(3)
Maxminimization and Nash equilibrium
364(1)
Strictly competitive games
365(2)
Maxminimization and Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games
367(10)
Maxminimization: some history
370(3)
Empirical tests: experiments, tennis, and soccer
373(2)
Notes
375(2)
Rationalizability
377(16)
Rationalizability
377(8)
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions
385(3)
Iterated elimination of weakly dominated actions
388(3)
Dominance solvability
391(2)
Notes
392(1)
Evolutionary Equilibrium
393(26)
Monomorphic pure strategy equilibrium
394(6)
Evolutionary game theory: some history
399(1)
Mixed strategies and polymorphic equilibrium
400(6)
Asymmetric contests
406(5)
Side-blotched lizards
407(2)
Explaining the outcomes of contests in nature
409(2)
Variation on a theme: sibling behavior
411(3)
Variation on a theme: the nesting behavior of wasps
414(2)
Variation on a theme: the evolution of the sex ratio
416(3)
Notes
417(2)
Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma
419(32)
The main idea
419(2)
Preferences
421(2)
Repeated games
423(1)
Finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
424(2)
Infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
426(1)
Strategies in an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
426(2)
Some Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
428(3)
Nash equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
431(6)
Experimental evidence
436(1)
Subgame perfect equilibria and the one-deviation property
437(4)
Axelrod's tournaments
439(2)
Some subgame perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
441(5)
Reciprocal altruism among sticklebacks
445(1)
Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
446(3)
Medieval trade fairs
448(1)
Concluding remarks
449(2)
Notes
449(2)
Repeated Games: General Results
451(14)
Nash equilibria of general infinitely repeated games
451(4)
Subgame perfect equilibria of general infinitely repeated games
455(5)
Finitely repeated games
460(1)
Variation on a theme: imperfect observability
461(4)
Notes
463(2)
Bargaining
465(28)
Bargaining as an extensive game
465(12)
Illustration: trade in a market
477(4)
Nash's axiomatic model
481(8)
Relation between strategic and axiomatic models
489(4)
Notes
491(2)
Appendix: Mathematics
493(14)
Numbers
493(1)
Sets
494(1)
Functions
495(3)
Profiles
498(1)
Sequences
499(1)
Probability
499(6)
Proofs
505(2)
References507(18)
Index525

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