Amazon no longer offers textbook rentals. We do!

The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

by: Kraakman, Reinier; Davies, Paul; Hansmann, Henry; Hertig, Gerard; Hopt, Klaus; Kanda, Hideki; Rock, Edward

The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

by: Kraakman, Reinier; Davies, Paul; Hansmann, Henry; Hertig, Gerard; Hopt, Klaus; Kanda, Hideki; Rock, Edward

ISBN 13:
9780199260638
ISBN 10:
019926063X
Format: Hardcover
Copyright: 05/20/2004
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Newer Edition

Rent

Sorry, this item is currently unavailable.

Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.

Extend or Purchase Your Rental at Any Time

Need to keep your rental past your due date? At any time before your due date you can extend or purchase your rental through your account.

Summary

This book is a concise analytical overview of the field of corporate law. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-à-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees.

List of Authors

1 What is Corporate Law?

(20)

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman

1.1 Introduction

(4)

1.2 What is a corporation?

(10)

1.2.1 Legal personality

(2)

1.2.2 Limited liability

(2)

1.2.3 Transferable shares

(1)

1.2.4 Delegated management with a board structure

(2)

1.2.5 Investor ownership

(2)

1.3 What does corporate law include?

(2)

1.3.1 Secondary and partial corporations forms

(1)

1.3.2 Additional sources of corporate law

(1)

1.3.3 Non-corporate law constraints

(1)

1.4 What is the goal of corporate law?

(4)

2 Agency Problems and Legal Strategies

(12)

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman

2.1 Three agency problems

(2)

2.2 Legal strategies for reducing agency costs

(5)

2.2.1 Regulatory strategies

(3)

2.2.2 Governance strategies

(1)

2.2.3 Ex post and ex ante strategies

(1)

2.3 Legal strategies in corporate context

(1)

2.4 The role of law

(4)

3 The Basic Governance Structure

(38)

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman

3.1 How governance strategies protect shareholders as a class

(21)

3.1.1 The appointment rights strategy

(12)

3.1.2 The other strategies: Decision rights, trusteeship, incentives, constraints, and affiliation rights

(8)

3.2 Protecting minority shareholders

(7)

3.2.1 The appointment rights strategy

(3)

3.2.2 The decision rights strategy

(1)

3.2.3 The trusteeship strategy

(2)

3.2.4 The reward, constraints, and affiliation rights strategies

(1)

3.2.5 Reflecting on the minority-majority shareholder conflict

(1)

3.3 Protecting non-shareholder constituencies

(6)

3.3.1 The appointment rights strategy

(3)

3.3.2 The trusteeship strategy

(1)

3.3.3 The constraints strategy

(1)

3.4 Patterns of corporate governance

(4)

4 Creditor Protection

(30)

Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda

4.1 Why should corporate law protect creditors?

(6)

4.1.1 Companies in the vicinity of insolvency

(1)

4.1.2 Corporate groups

(2)

4.1.3 Involuntary creditors

(1)

4.2 Regulatory strategies for creditor protection

(20)

4.2.1 Mandatory disclosure-The entry strategy

(4)

4.2.2 Rules governing legal capital and corporate groups

(5)

4.2.3 Fiduciary duties-The standards strategy

(9)

4.3 Explaining differences in creditor protection

(4)

4.3.1 The extent of divergence

(1)

4.3.2 The importance of divergence

(3)

5 Related Party Transactions

101

(30)

Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda

5.1 Conflicted transactions by managers

101

(17)

5.1.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy

103

(2)

5.1.2 Disinterested board approval: The trusteeship strategy

105

(4)

5.1.3 Shareholder voting: The decision rights strategy

109

(2)

5.1.4 Prohibiting conflicted transactions: The rules strategy

111

(3)

5.1.5 The duty of loyalty: The standards strategy

114

(4)

5.2 Transactions involving controlling shareholders

118

(10)

5.2.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy

119

(2)

5.2.2 Board and shareholder ratification: The trusteeship and decision rights strategies

121

(2)

5.2.3 Fiduciary duties and fairness norms: The standards strategy

123

(5)

5.3 Explaining differences in the regulation of related party transactions

128

(3)

6 Significant Corporate Actions

131

(26)

Edward Rock, Hideki Kanda and Reinier Kraakman

6.1 What are significant corporate actions?

131

(2)

6.2 Mergers and similar organic changes

133

(12)

6.2.1 The management-shareholder conflict

133

(6)

6.2.2 The majority-minority shareholder conflict

139

(5)

6.2.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies

144

(1)

6.3 Sales of assets

145

(1)

6.4 Legal capital, share issues, and corporate distributions

145

(6)

6.4.1 The manager-shareholder conflict

146

(1)

6.4.2 The majority-minority shareholder conflict

147

(4)

6.4.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies

151

(1)

6.5 Fully delegated decisions: Investment and debt

151

(2)

6.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of significant corporate actions

153

(4)

7 Control Transactions

157

(36)

Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt

7.1 Agency problems in control transactions

157

(6)

7.1.1 Control transactions

157

(2)

7.1.2 Agency issues

159

(4)

7.2 Agency problems where shareholdings are dispersed: Two models of regulation

163

(10)

7.2.1 Basic models

163

(1)

7.2.2 The first model: Non-frustration of the offer

164

(4)

7.2.3 The second model: Directors controlling access to the shareholders

168

(2)

7.2.4 Rationales for the second model

170

(2)

7.2.5 Comparing the two models

172

(1)

7.3 Agency problems of dispersed shareholders when a general offer is made

173

(11)

7.3.1 Information asymmetry: The affiliation strategy

174

(2)

7.3.2 Pressure to accept the offer: The reward strategy

176

(2)

7.3.3 The mandatory bid rule: The exit strategy

178

(3)

7.3.4 Competing bids

181

(2)

7.3.5 Acquisition of dissenting minorities

183

(1)

7.4 Agency issues where there are controlling shareholders

184

(3)

7.5 Agency problems of non-shareholder groups

187

(2)

7.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of control transactions

189

(4)

8 Issuers and Investor Protection

193

(22)

Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman and Edward Rock

8.1 Two objectives of investor protection

194

(1)

8.2 The entry strategy: Mandatory disclosure

195

(12)

8.2.1 Jurisdictional variations

197

(4)

8.2.2 Accounting methodology

201

(1)

8.2.3 Exiting disclosure requirements

202

(2)

8.2.4 Why make disclosure mandatory?

204

(3)

8.3 Quality control: The trusteeship strategy

207

(1)

8.4 Quality control: The rules and standards strategies

208

(4)

8.4.1 The rules strategy

209

(1)

8.4.2 The standards strategy

210

(2)

8.5 Explaining differences in investor protection

212

(3)

9 Beyond the Anatomy

215

(12)

Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig and Klaus Hopt

9.1 Our approach

215

(2)

9.2 Putting our results into context

217

(1)

9.3 Existing commonalities

218

(4)

9.3.1 Robustness

218

(3)

9.3.2 Causes of remaining divergence

221

(1)

9.4 Roadmap for further research

222

(5)

Index

227

Amazon no longer offers textbook rentals. We do!

The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

9780199260638

019926063X

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

Write a Review

Amazon no longer offers textbook rentals. We do!

The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

9780199260638

019926063X

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

Write a Review

Related Products